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Famine’s Aftermath: Retrenchment or Reform?
Edward P. Reed
North Korea is conventionally understood to be a kind of “black hole” 
about which very little can be known—the proverbial riddle wrapped in an 
enigma.1 Haggard and Noland have demonstrated that this is not the case; 
a lack of information can no longer be used as an excuse for bad policy. By 
assembling  most  of  the  credible  sources  of  information  (though  limited 
primarily to English sources) and carefully cross-checking data and claims, 
with Famine in North Korea the authors have provided perhaps the most 
comprehensive description and rigorous analysis yet of the North Korean 
famine,  its  political-economic  context,  and  its  aftermath.  They  have  also 
posed the key questions that must be addressed if the right lessons are to 
be drawn and good future policies to be developed. These questions include: 
What caused the famine? Should large-scale assistance have been provided 
under the constraints imposed by Pyongyang? What has been the impact of 
food aid both on the population and on the North Korean system? What is the 
ultimate solution to the economic decline and continuing food scarcity? How 
should we deal with the North Korean regime in the future? 
The authors clearly identify the North Korean political and economic 
system as the ultimate cause of the persistent shortage of food and of the 
overall decline of the economy. This implies that the long-term solution to 
the problem lies neither in maintaining aid flows nor merely in agricultural 
restructuring but rather in implementing domestic economic reform and 
expanding commercial trade relations. The major multilateral and NGO 
aid agencies that responded to the famine understood, or quickly came to 
 1 The full text of Winston Churchill’s description of Russia in 1939 is quite useful for analyzing North 
Korea today: “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, 
inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.” See Winston 
Churchill, speech, October 1, 1939, CHAR 9/138/46, Churchill papers, Churchill Archives Centre, 
Churchill College, University of Cambridge u http://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/gallery/Russia/
CHAR_09_138_46.php.
edward p. reed is Korea Representative of The Asia Foundation based in Seoul. From 1994 
to 2000 he directed North Korea humanitarian aid programs for two NGOs, making over twenty 
monitoring visits to the North during that time. From 2000 to 2004 he was Associate Director 
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understand, the problem in these same terms.2 Their success in moving the 
North toward addressing long-term problems was so limited, not for want 
of trying but rather because of the complexity of the political and strategic 
context in which these groups were operating. Nevertheless, the infusion of 
large amounts of food and other types of aid did contribute to change. North 
Korea today is definitely not the same place it was in 1995 when foreign 
assistance began to flow into the country; the aid programs contributed to 
this change.
Through careful economic analysis the authors clarify the impact of food 
aid and whether the food reached the intended beneficiaries, was diverted to 
less deserving populations, or entered the emerging market. Being a highly 
valuable and fungible commodity, the donated food reinforced a kind of 
guerrilla market system that emerged as a result of the failings of the Public 
Distribution  System  (PDS).  Though  not  highlighted  in  this  volume,  the 
aid programs also put pressure on the North Korean system in other ways. 
Between 1996 and 2005 large numbers of foreign aid workers (World Food 
Program monitors as well as European and American NGO representatives) 
regularly traveled throughout North Korea, visiting food distribution centers, 
collective farms, hospitals, and children’s homes. These workers met with local 
officials and institutional directors and interacted with large numbers of the 
affected population. Despite the limitations placed on the strict monitoring of 
aid delivery, there can be little doubt that this decade of interaction at the local 
level—after years of almost total isolation of the population—spread new ways 
of thinking about the outside world and the role of the government. 
Just as important was intensive, and sometimes contentious, interaction 
with regime representatives and senior professionals at the center of power. In 
many cases aid program directors developed long-term working relationships 
with  bureaucrats  in  the  Ministries  of  Agriculture,  Health,  and  Food 
Administration and with scientists and scholars at research institutes and 
universities. Aid workers were able to appreciate the very narrow envelope 
of options within which local and national administrators operated as they 
struggled to understand and respond to events that were unfolding. Many 
North Korean officials acted sincerely, and some heroically, as they attempted 
to overcome bureaucratic and technical obstacles. This human side to the 
 2 One of the earliest analyses to note that a collapsed economy was the underlying cause of North 
Korea’s food shortage came from the United Nations. See “Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 
for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, January–December 1999,” UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, December 1998 u http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/
DPRK/infocentre/appealsdonors/DPRK%20Consolidated%20Appeals/DPRK_CAP_1999.pdf.[ 188 ]
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North Korean story of the last ten years is necessary to complete the hard 
analysis that Haggard and Noland so ably execute. 
In reflecting on the status and behavior of North Korea today a veteran 
aid worker might come to different, conflicting conclusions. On the one hand, 
compared to expectations held in the early years of the humanitarian response, 
by many measures North Korea has changed very little. The official message 
is still essentially the same: political considerations still trump humanitarian 
necessities.  Though  many  assumed  that  hard-won  gains  in  access  and 
transparency  would  accumulate  and  lead  to  substantial  liberalization,  we 
have now seen that improvements can be reversed, controls re-imposed, and 
aid agencies forced to close up shop. The most recent reversal is a restriction 
allowing only women over the age of 40 to trade in the marketplaces that are 
now the lifeline of much of the population.3
On the other hand, these nervous measures taken by the government—
such as rolling back markets, forcing people back onto the PDS dole, restricting 
contact  with  foreigners,  and  stamping  out  “anti-socialist”  influences—are 
clearly expressions of official alarm. A total reversal of these loosening trends 
is unlikely. There is a distinctly noticeable change in the atmosphere in the 
North from the stultifying and defeatist mood of 1996–98. Today a dynamic, 
if desperate, entrepreneurial spirit is widely reported, especially outside of 
Pyongyang.4 According to this view the regime is already riding a tiger; the 
question is whether the leadership will try to harness this new dynamism 
as a driving force for effective change or will instead be forced to attempt a 
dangerous dismount.
The way out may be in sight. North Korea has claimed that threats to 
national (or regime) security justified Pyongyang’s strict control over aid 
delivery and constrained the implementation of more far-reaching reforms. 
The perceived threat of hostile action by the United States required maintaining 
strict internal vigilance, and U.S.-led sanctions made accessing development 
assistance or engaging in normal financial and trade relationships impossible. 
Interestingly,  because  recent  developments  have  unfolded  along  the  lines 
of the optimistic scenario that the authors term “cooperative engagement” 
(p. 222), North Korea’s rationale for resisting change may soon be undermined. 
Washington’s  removal  of  North  Korea  from  the  list  of  state  sponsors  of 
terrorism will open up the possibility for the North to receive technical and 
 3 “New Restrictions on DPRK Market Trading,” Institute for Far Eastern Studies, NK Brief, 
no. 07-11-15-1, November 15, 2007 u http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/eng/m05/s10/content.
asp?nkbriefNO=166&GoP=%201. 
 4 Anna Fifield, “Selling to Survive,” Financial Times, November 19, 2007.[ 189 ]
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financial assistance from the World Bank and other multilateral institutions. 
At the same time South Korea has proposed major programs of economic 
cooperation that would create Kaesong-type complexes in several different 
locations in the North. After so many lost years and lost lives, the question 
then becomes whether the North Korean regime will finally take seriously 
to the road of reform and opening, even if only a reform “of our own style.”5 
And even if change is the intended policy, can this guerrilla economy—based 
on coping mechanisms and chicanery at every level—be the basis on which 
to build a rational economy? Or has the unraveling of the system and the 
entrenchment of new interests gone too far? The next twelve months or so 
may reveal the answer.
 5 As President Roh Moo-hyun learned directly from the Dear Leader himself, this will have to be 
a reform that dare not utter its name. See “Tongilbu homp’i ‘kaehyŏk kaebang’ yong’ŏ sakche” 
[Unification Ministry Deletes Use of “Reform and Opening” from Home Page], DongA.com, 




f all of the ills of the human condition, politically induced famine 
surely stands out as one of the most inhumane perversities. Other 
more  draconian  examples  of  gross  social  re-engineering  abound—
noticeably the Nazi genocide of World War II and the killing fields of 
Cambodia—but  the  deaths  of  millions  through  virtually  programmed 
starvation are equally genocidal. 
China’s Great Leap Forward of 1958–60 resulted in the deaths of 14–40 
million Chinese. The death toll in Darfur is in the hundreds of thousands. 
The Great Famine in Ukraine (1932–33) is estimated to have resulted in 
some 5 million fatalities. From 1994 to 1998 1–1.3 million North Koreans 
perished because of severe food shortages. The North Korean famine was 
triggered significantly by a political system that propelled and prolonged 
one of the greatest tragedies on the peninsula since the Korean War. One out 
chung min lee is Professor of International Relations at the Graduate School of International 
Studies at Yonsei University in Seoul, Korea. He can be reached at <chungminlee@gmail.com>.[ 190 ]
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of every twenty-two North Koreans died from this famine, while millions 
more suffered from severe malnutrition, irreparable health problems, and 
stunted growth. 
Yet what makes the North Korean famine so tragically unique—arguably 
the most vicious politically induced famine of the twentieth century—is that 
the country’s supreme leader Kim Jong-il considered the death of over one 
million citizens as necessary collateral damage. One frighteningly sad story 
encapsulates Kim’s culpability as the single most important factor behind the 
famine. Among the many faces of Kim Jong-il is that of a gourmet who has 
imported international chefs to whet his appetite. Precisely at the moment 
when North Korean peasants, farmers, and laymen were dying from hunger, 
Kim’s  personal  Japanese  chef  flew  to  Tokyo  via  Beijing  with  bundles  of 
Japanese yen to procure rare ingredients for the leader’s favorite sushi. In his 
memoirs, Kim Jong Il’s Chef, Kenji Fujimoto recounts a scene in which Kim 
Jong-il was able to tell if a piece of sushi was just slightly lighter than his 
preferred serving. 
In a majestic tour d’horizon, Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland’s 
Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform offers a systematic bird’s eye 
view of the fundamental causes and consequences of North Korea’s famine. 
The authors argue that a confluence of forces contributed to the triggering, 
and more significantly, prolongation of the famine that began in 1994. They 
trace the history of North Korea’s political economy and the roots of North 
Korea’s endemic food shortages, beginning with forced collectivization in the 
1950s, and continuing on with an emphasis on heavy industries, a nationwide 
military-industrial complex, and a reliance on “friendship” subsidies from the 
Soviet Union and China throughout much of the Cold War era. The authors 
should be lauded for filtering out data bias with an indefatigable attention 
to detail—not an easy task given the dearth of reliable official statistics from 
North Korea and the propensity for secretiveness that surrounds China’s food 
and fuel aid to the North.
The  authors  analyze  the  probable  causes  of  North  Korea’s  famine  by 
focusing on two main issues. First, the authors analyze internal structural 
causes, such as decades of accumulated decay in food rationing—i.e., the 
Public Distribution System, the diversion of state funds to sustain the world’s 
third  largest  standing  army,  and  the  stratification  of  society  into  “core,” 
“wavering,” and “hostile” classes. Second, the authors analyze a confluence 
of external and exogenous forces, including the collapse of Soviet assistance 
and trade privileges following the USSR’s demise in 1991, a more hostile 
international environment characterized by intermittent external pressures [ 191 ]
book review roundtable  •  famine in north korea
from key players such as the United States as perceived by North Korea, and 
the net impact of South Korea’s more flexible and aid-prone policy toward the 
North starting from the late 1990s.
One of the most interesting sections of the book is part II in which the 
authors focus on the dilemmas of humanitarian assistance. For this reviewer, 
the chapters on aid monitoring and diversion of food aid were particularly 
revealing, offering a detailed account of the structural weaknesses in the 
distribution of food aid by international organizations such as the World 
Food Program (WFP). Pyongyang often barred WFP monitors from entering 
the hardest hit areas, such as the northeastern region of North Korea (South 
and North Hamgyong Provinces), for instance. The authors point out that, 
with 43,000 ultimate food aid destinations, the WFP had to rely on North 
Korean assurances that the food would reach the most needy—the elderly, 
children, and pregnant women. In the end, however, significant constraints 
were basically insurmountable. 
Perhaps the most disturbing but poignant information in this study is 
in chapter 5, on the diversion of food aid. The authors stress that diversion 
is problematic for three key reasons: diverted aid misses the most important 
target  population,  feeds  corruption,  and  destroys  international  political 
support. Based on testimonies by North Korean defectors and estimates from 
aid workers, the authors assess that North Korea may have diverted 10–30% 
of food aid to the military but also food may have been channeled through 
severe loopholes at lower ends of the distribution chain. Although we only 
have access to what may be perceived as circumstantial evidence—smuggled 
videos  and  defectors’  testimonies,  for  example,  and  questionable  official 
statistics given the endemic lack of transparency and accountability on the 
part of North Korean officials—it is clear that, in a regime that devotes some 
25–30% of its GDP on defense and has adopted a so-called military first 
doctrine, North Korean leaders considered feeding the military the first line 
of regime security in more ways than one.
This study also assesses the twists and turns in foreign humanitarian 
assistance. The monitoring of food aid, or more precisely, the general ignoring 
of it, by North Korea’s two largest patrons—China and South Korea—is a point 
that deserves greater elucidation. One of the most disturbing aspects of aid 
diversion is South Korea’s, and to a lesser extent China’s, aversion to adopting 
a more stringent monitoring regime. Just prior to the June 2000 South-North 
summit  between  then  South  Korean  President  Kim  Dae-jung  and  North 
Korean leader Kim Jong-il, the Kim Dae-jung government paid North Korea 
$500 million through North Korean accounts in Macao. Where this money [ 192 ]
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went is unclear, but Kim Jong-il is highly unlikely to have dispersed the funds 
to those citizens who needed them most. As revenues from missiles and other 
arms exports dwindled throughout the 1990s, North Korea surely diverted 
some of Seoul’s $500 million “summit fee” to military use, including to the 
country’s nuclear weapons program.
Ever since the launch of South Korea’s Sunshine Policy in 1998 by the Kim 
Dae-jung government political parties in the South have remained divided on 
two key questions: whether the various types of South Korean aid reached 
the intended end users, and to what degree the Sunshine Policy positively 
shifted the North’s behavior. Though the debate still continues, engagement 
proponents argue that the “unique internal characteristics” of the regime limit 
the possibility of verification and that South Korean aid and investments have 
resulted in a “peace dividend” that must not be derailed.
However Kim Jong-il’s North Korea evolves in the remaining years of 
his reign, prospects for reforms akin to China’s and Vietnam’s open door 
economic policies are likely to remain low, precisely because enduring reforms 
would only weaken the regime’s hold on power. In this respect, Famine in 
North Korea adds valuable insights by excavating the structural constraints 
militating against the adoption of market economic reforms in the North, 
notwithstanding  limited  attempts  by  the  regime  to  construct  extremely 
contained  free  enterprise  zones  such  as  the  Kaesong  Industrial  Complex 
(which houses South Korean small- and medium-sized businesses). 
Ironically, a key side effect of North Korea’s famine—also addressed in 
the book—was North Korea’s inverse influence. Precisely because the plight 
was so serious, international donors and aid agencies had little choice but to 
comply with North Korean conditions in dispersing humanitarian assistance. 
The policy quandary is now even more complicated by the fact that, even 
in the midst of the North Korean economy’s self-destruction, Pyongyang 
continues to pose a security threat, as evinced by the country’s October 
2006 nuclear test. Though the ongoing six-party talks may ultimately result 
in the dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, the assumption 
that  Kim  Jong-il  is  willing  to  give  up  his  nuclear  arsenal  for  the  right 
price—political normalization with the United States and Japan and large 
infusions of foreign aid—continues to represent a huge leap of faith. Such a 
compromise would entail a strategic U-turn by Kim, potentially sowing the 
seeds of regime collapse.
Some time in the not-too-distant future—when North Korea’s center 
of gravity begins to shift in earnest—we will finally be able to verify and 
document the gross injustices committed by the Kim dynasty in the name of [ 193 ]
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social re-engineering. Until that day arrives, however, studies such as Famine 
in North Korea are indispensable in accounting for one of the most tragic 
episodes in twentieth century Korean and Asian history. In bygone eras of 
Chinese and Korean dynasties, the sine qua non of the “mandate of heaven” 
was the emperor’s ability to serve the people. In this respect, the “emperor’s 
famine” in North Korea will be recorded in history as the beginning of the end 




he great North Korean famine of 1996–99 was the worst humanitarian 
disaster to strike East Asia since China’s famine under Mao’s rule in 
1958–61. The North Korean famine is unusual for three reasons. First, the 
famine occurred in an industrial, urban, and highly literate society. Second, 
the crisis arose in the middle of the world’s most dynamic region. Third, the 
disaster occurred during a peaceful era in regional history, a time without 
significant social upheaval.
The famine no doubt will attract much attention in the decades to come, 
and Haggard and Noland’s Famine in North Korea constitutes one of the first 
comprehensive academic studies of this topic. This book is a “must-read” for 
all students of North Korea and contemporary East Asia and is likely to remain 
a standard on this issue until North Korean archive materials are opened to 
researchers, which of course is unlikely to occur in the next decade or two.
The  authors  dealt  with  formidable  challenges,  the  most  serious  of 
which being the acute shortage of data. North Korea is probably the world’s 
most secretive state; when statistics are released from Pyongyang, one can 
be sure that the figures have been doctored to serve political schemes and 
agendas.  Haggard  and  Noland  carefully  collected  all  available  data  from 
different sources, including government materials, NGO reports, and witness 
testimonies. Though the picture that is portrayed may be incomplete (and 
andrei lankov is Associate Professor at Kookmin University, Seoul. Born in the then Soviet 
Union in 1963, he has published a number of books and articles on the North Korean history, including 
Crisis in North Korea (University of Hawaii Press, 2005) and North of the DMZ (McFarland & Co., 
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perhaps even wrong in some regards), this fault is applicable to almost all 
research on North Korea. Given the current situation, one could thus hardly 
do more than the authors have accomplished.
The North Korean government blamed the disaster on great floods that hit 
the country in 1995–96. The book indicates, however, that the natural calamity 
played a rather marginal role in the collapse of North Korean agriculture and 
that this collapse began years before the floods, as clearly indicated by a steady 
decline in food consumption. Initially the government attempted to resolve 
problems through such outdated measures as attempts to boost productivity 
in the cooperative farms through “better” ideological indoctrinations. The 
government also made equally futile attempts to ban private trade at the 
markets and through limiting food consumption; one such example was the 
launching of the bizarre “let’s eat two meals a day” campaign. These efforts did 
not, however, meet with success.
Why did the North Korean leaders follow this conservative line? Why 
did they not imitate the markedly successful reforms of China and Vietnam? 
The answer to those questions lies in the existence of another Korea, the 
prosperous and free South where per capita income is ten to thirty times 
greater than in the North (depending on which statistics are used). Pyongyang 
is afraid that liberalization will bring an instant loss of control: aware of South 
Korea’s prosperity, North Korean citizens might rise against their rulers if the 
government begins to institute reforms. Though hypothetical, the possibility 
of  such  a  scenario  unfolding  prevents  North  Korea’s  elites  from  relaxing 
their positions. The authors demonstrate quite well, however, that despite 
all of the government’s bans and restrictions, grass-roots marketization is 
occurring from below. Though some minor government-led reforms have 
been introduced—such as increasing the area of individual farming plots—
the system has largely remained unchanged overall. Even the “improvement 
measures” of 2002, once trumpeted with fanfare in the international media as 
far-reaching reforms, were quietly rolled back a few years later.
North Korean leaders clearly believe that relaxation of the system might 
cause the regime to implode, in which case they would likely face criminal 
persecution for past misdeeds and could even lose their lives. Therefore, 
Pyongyang’s policies are driven by a set of priorities that places saving the 
political regime well ahead of saving the population. As Famine in North 
Korea demonstrates, the policies pursued by the government, though not 
deliberately aimed at starving large parts of the population, were based on 
the assumption that a large number of lives could and should be sacrificed if 
necessary in order to maintain regime control.[ 195 ]
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The government was slow to admit the emergence of the food problem 
when the situation deteriorated in 1991–92. Such an admission would ruin 
the decades-old propaganda of the “earthly paradise” and would demonstrate 
Pyongyang’s potential vulnerability in a time of an unfolding nuclear crisis. 
Pyongyang  eventually  chose  to  jettison  the  “earthly  paradise”  myth  and 
learned even to exaggerate the scale of material damage in order to maximize 
foreign aid. This new approach took time to develop, however, and the initial 
reluctance to admit the problem meant that appeals to relief agencies were not 
issued until much too late.
The  aid  distribution  was  arranged  in  a  way  that  served  the  regime’s 
political  goals.  The  book  demonstrates  that  the  government  deliberately 
limited the food supply to some areas that the leaders deemed expendable 
(especially to the northeastern coast of the country). The rumors of a “triage” 
policy, allegedly exercised by the Pyongyang leadership, have been around for 
long time (p. 64), but Haggard and Noland’s research demonstrates that these 
rumors are by no means unfounded (pp. 68–76).
The book also sheds some light on the issue of aid diversion. The authors 
estimate that the amount of food aid diverted to the military, political elite, 
and other privileged groups was between 10% and 50% of the total amount 
of aid, with 30% being their basic estimate (p. 125). Additionally, foreign 
aid enabled the government to use the locally produced grain to keep the 
“core groups,” especially the military, well supplied with food. This approach 
ensured the survival of the Kim family regime. All domestic groups whose 
discontent could have dangerous effects (i.e., the army, police, and populaces 
of major cities) were kept alive and relatively content through the combination 
of aid distribution, police terror, and information control. This policy decision 
also meant, however, that Pyongyang could not possibly comply with the 
established norms that usually govern the provision of food aid. Only a limited 
number of inspections were allowed and, of the limited number of monitors, 
no Korean-speaking inspectors were permitted. 
The  book  makes  readers  face  a  difficult  question:  when  the  foreign 
community agreed to provide aid to a regime with very little transparency, 
did this decision do more harm than good? No uncontroversial answer to this 
question exists. Although isolation and pressure might hasten the collapse of 
a repressive regime, the cost of such treatment also means the likelihood of 
greater suffering and higher casualties. This price for change is too high. After 
all, the events of 1996–99 demonstrated that North Korea’s rulers care little 
if a large segment of the population—between 600,000 and 1 million people, 
according to the authors’ estimates—starved to death (p. 76).[ 196 ]
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The  authors  of  Famine  in  North  Korea  clearly  indicate  that  isolating 
North Korea would be both immoral and unworkable. States pursue their 
own (sometimes mutually exclusive) interests, and North Korea is highly 
skilled at manipulating these self-interests for the country’s own benefit. In 
this sense, the concept of an “international community” is often fictional. For 
example, as this reviewer has argued many times, China and South Korea 
did not want to see the North Korean regime collapse and hence were willing 
to  provide  Pyongyang  with  generous  and  unconditional  aid  irrespective 
of U.S. and Western policies. These neighbors knew full well that such aid 
strengthens the North Korean regime. This is not to say, however, that aid 
from other countries was not also influenced by political considerations—the 
book clearly demonstrates that such a link existed in almost all cases (pp. 
126–61). The point here, though, is that isolation did not work because of a 
lack of support from two of the major players.
Although  the  aid  exposed  North  Korea  to  the  outside  world  and 
contributed toward the ongoing decline of old Stalinist values, a difficult 
question remains. Foreign aid saved many lives but also contributed to the 
survival of a regime that cares little for its citizens. Was this a worthwhile 
compromise?  Perhaps.  As  Famine  in  North  Korea  demonstrates  clearly, 
however,  the  North  Korean  regime  knows  how  to  keep  the  country’s 
population terrified and thus docile and how to play off of the sensibilities 
and fears of foreign donors. The regime’s leaders are ruthlessly efficient in 
pursuing their overriding goal of political survival, even if this ambition 
entails the death of half a million people or more. With such leaders at the 
helm, and with North Korea’s major neighbors willing to turn a blind eye 
toward the most outrageous abuses, one cannot hope that the manifold 
problems faced by the North Korean people will be resolved any time soon.[ 197 ]
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North Korea as the Wicked Witch of the East:  
Social Science as Fairy Tale
Hazel Smith
T
his review holds that the raison d’etre of Famine in North Korea by 
Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, which was originally written as 
a background briefing for the Washington, D.C.-based U.S. Committee on 
Human Rights,1 is to demonstrate that the government of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has committed “crimes against humanity” 
(p. 209). In the view of this reviewer the empirical investigations supporting 
this claim do not stand up to scientific scrutiny. This critique will focus on 
the volume’s central contention: the North Korean government always had 
enough food to feed the population and chose not to. The book asserts that 
(1) there was always sufficient cereal to feed the entire population and that (2) 
the World Food Program (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) consistently overestimated the basic cereal requirements of the North 
Korean population. 
Lots of Food?
The authors claim that during the 1990s food supply always exceeded 
demand (p. 47 and graph on p. 45). They base this claim on the calculation 
that if the entire population needed 167 kilograms (kg) of basic grains (cereal) 
per person per year (the standard FAO/WFP figure) then the total amount of 
cereal that would be required to meet the minimum needs of the population 
would be equal to the total population times 167 kg of cereal. Because no 
authority disputes that the DPRK surpassed this total every year throughout 
the  1990s  by  way  of  domestic  production,  aid,  and  imports,  the  authors 
conclude that, if the available cereal had been distributed equally, no one 
would have starved (p. 46). An understanding of the basic cereal requirements 
of any population, however, repudiates this conclusion.
Minimum basic human requirements for survival include cereal to meet 
the food requirements of a population as well as the cereal required for seeds 
 1 Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Hunger and Human Rights: The Politics of Food in North 
Korea (Washington D.C.: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2005).
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books include Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance, and Social Change in 
North Korea (USIP Press, 2005) and Reconstituting Korean Security: A Policy Primer (United Nations 
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and animal feed. Farmers need cereal for future crops and to feed livestock as 
well as for subsistence. Furthermore, basic cereal accounting always includes 
an estimated amount for post-harvest losses, which are a problem for all 
countries, including wealthy nations. In poor countries, where infrastructure, 
transport, and technology are lacking or in poor condition, such losses can be 
significant. This form of cereal balance accounting for basic human needs is a 
standard and uncontroversial “tool of the trade” for international agronomists 
and professionals concerned with assessing food security in any country. 
Cereal balance accounting for the DPRK by the FAO, as well as South Korean, 
Swiss, U.S., and NGO officials, follow this common practice.2 
In the DPRK the FAO identified non-food, but nevertheless essential, 
usages of cereal necessary to meet basic needs—i.e., the minimum necessary 
to ensure physical survival of the population—as consisting of seed, feed, post-
harvest losses, and other uses.3 The proportions of each have remained fairly 
stable over time. In 2002, for instance, the FAO attributed 77.3% of the DPRK’s 
estimated basic cereal requirements to food needs, some 3.4% to animal feed, 
4.5% for seed, 12.2% to post-harvest losses, and 2.4% to “other uses.”4 The 
other uses category includes food processing, such as noodle production.5 
The authors’ argument is based upon the assumption that cereal required 
for seed, feed, and post-harvest losses were non-essential or optional. The 
 2 See, for example, “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea,” Food and Agriculture Organization for the United Nations (FAO)/World Food Program 
(WFP), Special Report, December 22, 1995; “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” FAO/WFP, Special Alert, no. 267, May 16, 1996; “Crop 
and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” FAO/WFP, 
Special Alert, no. 275, June 3, 1997; “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea,” FAO/WFP, Special Report, November 25, 1997; “Food and Crop 
Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” FAO/WFP, December 10, 
1997; “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” 
FAO/WFP, June 25, 1998; “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea,” FAO/WFP, Special Report, June 29, 1999; “Crop and Food Supply Assessment 
Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” FAO/WFP, July 24, 2000; “Crop and Food 
Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” FAO/WFP, Special 
Report, November 16, 2000; “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea,” FAO/WFP, October 26, 2001; “Crop and Food Supply Assessment 
Mission to the DPRK,” FAO/WFP, Special Report, October 30, 2003; and “Crop and Food Supply 
Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” FAO/WFP, November 22, 
2004. See also standard cereal balance in Woon Keun Kim, Hyunok Lee, and Daniel A. Sumner, 
“Assessing the Food Situation in North Korea,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 46, no. 
3 (April 1998): 525.
 3 “Crop and Food Supply Assessment,” October 30, 2003, 17–18. Earlier FAO cereal balances are less 
sophisticated, simply categorizing non-food uses of cereal as either for feed or “other uses, seed 
and losses.” See, for instance, “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission,” June 25, 1998; and 
“Crop and Food Supply Assessment,” June 29, 1999. Later FAO/WFP crop assessments give detailed 
breakdowns, making it a straightforward exercise to identify the relative proportions of non-food 
cereal uses.
 4 “Crop and Food Supply Assessment,” October 30, 2003.
 5 See “Crop and Food Supply Assessment,” July 24, 2000, 12–13 for food processing examples.[ 199 ]
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authors  thus  delete  these  uses  from  DPRK  cereal  balance  assessments  of 
the minimum human need (p. 45). As a result, approximately 20% of the 
annual cereal requirement of North Korea is discounted. The authors are thus 
able to argue that cereal availability always met the needs of the population 
throughout the famine years and that, therefore, “the [cereal] shortfall does 
not imply an inability to meet basic needs but rather would reflect a failure to 
meet basic needs because alternative uses were prioritized” (p. 48).
This  interpretation  of  cereal  balances  clearly  contradicts  basic 
agronomy: without seed and animal feed, farmers do not have the ability 
to plant crops and thus to feed themselves, the rest of the country, and 
animals  used  for  food  and  transport  in  subsequent  years.  The  authors 
display a similar lack of understanding of the nature of agriculture in poor 
countries in terms of the scale and inevitability of post-harvest losses. The 
book’s mischaracterization of the FAO standard categories—stating that 
non-food uses of cereal were for “livestock feed, the production of liquor 
and postharvest losses” (p. 47)—leads this reviewer to wonder if the facts 
are being made to fit the explanation.
Haggard and Noland thus both omit the vital use of cereal for seed 
(necessary if farmers are not to starve in future years) and also cite “liquor 
production” as if this were a documented use that carried the same weight in 
the cereal use pattern as seed, animal feed, and post-harvest losses. Their claim 
that cereal is used for liquor production is not in fact substantiated but merely 
asserted. Even if all processed cereals were used for liquor production—and 
there is no evidence presented in this book or anywhere else to suggest that this 
might be true—this use would be trivial, at 2.4% of the total, compared to the 
98.6% of cereal use for incontestably essential requirements. Nevertheless, the 
mention of liquor production as a typical non-food use of cereals buttresses 
the claim that the North Korean government behaved in a wicked and immoral 
way by choosing not to feed its starving people and instead diverted essential 
agricultural goods into the morally dubious production of alcohol. 
Nobody was Hungry?
Drawing almost entirely from one chapter written by Heather Smith for 
a compilation edited by Noland in 1998,6 Haggard and Noland argue that the 
FAO/WFP figure of 167 kg of cereal per person per year overestimated the 
 6 Heather Smith, “The Food Economy: The Catalyst for Collapse?” in Economic Integration of the 
Korean Peninsula, ed. Marcus Noland (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 
1998), 53–75.[ 200 ]
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amount of cereals needed by North Koreans by approximately 20% (p. 46). 
To arrive at this conclusion, they infer that (1) the WFP/FAO identified only 
rice and corn as constituting the cereal ration and ignored the fact that North 
Koreans ate other cereals such as potatoes and (2) North Koreans habitually 
consumed non-cereal foods (p. 46).
On the first point, the authors are factually incorrect. A glance at 
any of the dozens of reports from the FAO/WFP shows that the FAO/
WFP identified a number of different sources of calories in the North 
Korean diet with the mainstays, rice and corn, supplemented by millet and 
potatoes.7 Note that one authoritative technical and scholarly analysis that 
supports a different interpretation than that of the book, while cited in the 
bibliography, has findings on this issue that are not mentioned in the text. 
Kim, Lee, and Sumner argue that it is reasonable to assess the rice and 
corn requirements of an average North Korean in the early to mid-1990s 
as roughly 87% of the requirements of a South Korean in the 1960s.8 This 
assessment would give a per capita consumption of 164 kg, which is not 
very far off the WFP/FAO figure. 
On  the  second  point,  the  authors  seem  to  confuse  calories  with 
commodities.  The  FAO/WFP  merely  reiterates  the  fact  that  any  adult, 
including one in North Korea, would need to receive at least 167 kg of cereals 
per year, which is the equivalent of about 1,700 calories per day (much less 
than that required for normal basic sustenance), to have a chance of staying 
alive. Because potatoes and soya beans are already included in the FAO 
cereal balances, it is difficult to find what other foods the North Koreans were 
supposed to have habitually eaten. Most only ate meat on holidays. Protein 
from anything other than soya was and remains a luxury good. Vegetables 
and fruit provide much-needed vitamins and minerals but are a negligible 
source of calories. 
With regard to the point that the FAO/WFP overestimated the amount 
of basic grains that would be needed for basic survival purposes at 167 kg 
of cereal per person per year, there is actually a strong argument that the 
minimum requirement should have been 10–25% higher than 167 kg (or 
183.7 kg). This new estimate would take into account the extra calories 
needed by a population regularly facing winter temperatures of between 
-20  and  -40  degrees  centigrade.  The  U.S.  Army  advises  that  the  extra 
 7 See, for example, any of the Crop Assessment reports cited in note 2 above.
 8 Kim, Lee, and Sumner, “Assessing the Food Situation in North Korea,” 526–27.[ 201 ]
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calorific requirement in extreme winter temperatures is between 25% and 
50% of a normal diet.9
The Methodology: The Wicked Witch of the East Approach
The  core  argument  depends  on  the  counterfactual:  if  the  DPRK 
government had maintained commercial aid imports, and if the government 
had  not  used  cereal  balances  for  “non-essential  uses”  such  as  liquor 
production,  then  the  famine  would  not  have  happened.  Unfortunately, 
the highly specific data sets that would be required to give this argument 
credibility are not presented. The data on commercial cereal imports is 
presented as an uncontested fact. Yet in reality commercial import figures 
have been difficult to quantify; one of Haggard and Noland’s bibliographic 
sources  uses  higher  figures  than  they  do  for  the  same  years.10  The 
discrepancies are understandable given DPRK data collection problems. 
Because discrepancies are not acknowledged and the data is presented as 
if it was non-controversial, however, the credibility of the argumentation is 
open to question.
Another problem with the methodology is that the counterfactual 
argumentation relies on a problematic presentation of chronology. The 
authors  present  a  graph  purporting  to  demonstrate  a  “normal”  food 
import pattern between 1991 and 1997 (p. 43). They argue that Pyongyang 
was therefore culpable starting in 1998, as the drop in commercial import 
levels below that “normal” level allowed by the government was a causative 
factor in the starvation—“a phenomenon…not unknown in other famines” 
(p. 44). This is at best a contradictory argument and at worst misleading, as 
by most accounts (including that of Haggard and Noland) the famine was 
over by 1999 (p. 7).
The  counterfactual  argumentation  is  thus  weakened  by  dependence 
on contestable data, non-standard conceptual interpretations (e.g., on the 
cereal balance), and contradictory chronological argumentation. Indeed, to 
be persuasive the counterfactuals practically require the a priori attribution 
of malign intent to the DPRK government for its “irresponsibility” (p. 46). 
Thus there is a rather tautological circularity at the heart of the analysis. If 
Pyongyang  was  irresponsible  and  callous,  then  the  government  was  by 
 9 See the U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine webpage u http://www.usariem.
army.mil/nutri/nuadcold.htm.
  10 Compare, for example, the figures used in Kim, Lee, and Sumner, “Assessing the Food Situation in 
North Korea,” 531 with the figures found in Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Famine in North 
Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 43.[ 202 ]
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definition capable of committing a crime against humanity for which all 
the data presented demonstrates culpability. Haggard and Noland discount 
alternative interpretations of food supply and demand data that do not fit their 
analysis.11 The prior assumption is that all outcomes can be ascribed solely to 
an omniscient, manipulative, and evil actor (the North Korean government) 
whose activities are beyond rational calculation. This approach signifies the 
abandonment of the scientific enterprise, akin to ascribing explanatory power 
to the Wicked Witch of the East.
No More Fairy Tales Please
David Hume warned long ago of the dangers of trying to derive normative 
statements from empirical claims. There is practically a library of research 
on why scientists cannot do this. The simple reason is that facts can be used 
to justify any normative conclusion. The view from Washington might be, 
for instance, that North Korean troops and artillery located just miles north 
of the DMZ are “offensively positioned.” From Pyongyang, however, those 
same  troops  appear  defensively  positioned  between  the  nation’s  capital 
and several hundred thousand South Korean and U.S. troops, armed with 
technology vastly more sophisticated and deadly than that possessed by the 
North Koreans.
In  the  view  of  this  reviewer,  insufficient  and  inadequate  research, 
combined with a rather obvious political bias toward regime change, has 
resulted in a host of factual errors (there really are no such things as high 
protein biscuits, for example; Ryanggang, despite having many residents 
dependent to the public distribution system dependents, is the least urbanized 
North  Korean  province,  and  certainly  not  “above  the  mean”)  (pp.  112, 
63). This methodology relies heavily on tautology (the DPRK government 
is wicked therefore it does wicked things therefore it is wicked), stretches 
concepts so as to mislead, cherry-picks isolated facts while leaving out those 
that do not support the central contentions of the book, and insufficiently 
acknowledges  research  findings  from  the  now  extensive  scholarship  on 
DPRK food, nutrition, and aid. 
  11 See, for instance, Suk Lee, “Food Shortages and Economic Institutions in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea,” (PhD diss., Department of Economics, University of Warwick, 2003). “Facts” 
from Lee’s account, for instance his seminal analysis of famine deaths, are cherry-picked, but there 
is no critical engagement with Lee’s analysis, which comes to diametrically different conclusions 
than the authors and is based on an extraordinarily comprehensive and extensive account and 
study of all extant DPRK agricultural statistics.[ 203 ]
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We need more from scholarship than a methodology that relies on the 
allegedly baleful intent of the DPRK government as a deux ex machina to 
explain all outcomes. This is methodology akin to that of a fairy tale. There is 
indeed a real need for rigorous scientific work on the DPRK and normative 
critiques based on disciplined ethical reasoning. This reviewer would argue 
that this book provides neither.
Authors’ Response:  
Famine in North Korea—A Reprise
Stephan Haggard & Marcus Noland
Our intention in writing Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform 
was threefold: to provide an account of the North Korean famine of the mid-
1990s, to construct a political economy of the complex aid relationships that 
ensued, and to consider the consequences of the famine for the reform of the 
North Korean economy. Our interests were not simply historical; we believe 
it is impossible to understand North Korea today without understanding the 
trauma of the famine. 
The core of our argument bears restating at the outset. We argue that the 
famine was fundamentally a product of state failure. Faced with deteriorating 
conditions following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the North Korean 
government failed to avail itself of potential sources of external supply and 
instead compressed domestic demand. As the availability of food began a 
secular decline in the first half of the 1990s, internal institutions and practices 
broke down. But the distress, although general, was not evenly distributed 
across  the  population;  distribution  mattered.  The  relatively  industrialized 
northeast of the country was particularly hard hit. 
stephan haggard is the Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor at the Graduate School of 
International Relations and Pacific Studies. His newest book is Democracy, Development and Welfare 
States: Latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe (with Robert Kaufman, forthcoming 2008). He can 
be reached at <shaggard@ucsd.edu>.
marcus noland is a Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. He 
has authored or edited thirteen books, including Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas 
(2000), winner of the Ohira Memorial Prize, and Korea After Kim Jong-il (2004). He can be reached at 
<mnoland@petersoninstitute.org>.[ 204 ]
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The inability of the state to provide food led to grass-roots marketization 
of the economy as small-scale social units engaged in entrepreneurial coping 
behavior to access food, a development that ultimately resulted in the alteration 
of basic social relations. Subsequent North Korean economic policy changes 
are best understood as reactive responses to this bottom-up process, an effort 
to regain control over a fraying social economy rather than to liberalize.
Although the approach we take to these issues in Famine in North Korea 
is largely empirical, the argument is nested in a broader approach to famine 
pioneered by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen. The core insight of Sen’s work 
on famine is that the provision of food is never simply the result of purely 
economic factors, agronomic conditions, or exogenous shocks such as drought 
or floods.1 Rather, the availability of food reflects a more deeply structured 
set of social relations that either guarantee or fail to guarantee sustenance. In 
socialist countries, these entitlements are rooted neither in the distribution of 
private property nor in the market but in the public distribution system (PDS) 
through which the bulk of food—and virtually all food for urban residents—
ultimately passes. 
Sen does not contend that authoritarian regimes will inevitably generate 
famine. Neither does he—nor do we—argue that authoritarian governments 
will ignore distress when it comes to their attention or deliberately starve 
their people. Sen does maintain, however, that governments that are not 
accountable to their citizens are lacking in both the information and the 
incentives to respond effectively to severe distress when it arises. There is little 
doubt in our minds that the North Korean case vindicates this simple point 
in a powerful way.
In our book, however, we extend this argument about entitlement failure 
in several ways. The North Korean famine was closely linked not only to 
the socialization of the economy and the nature of the political system but 
also to myths of self-reliance that were fundamental to the “Kimist” system. 
The inability of North Korea to provide adequate food was due in no small 
measure to the regime’s inability—and, in our view, unwillingness—to access 
foreign sources of supply.
We would like to thank the participants in this roundtable for agreeing to 
air the arguments in Famine in North Korea in such depth. We organize our 
response around three main issues: (1) the balance between food availability 
decline (FAD) and distributional issues as causes of the famine, (2) the role of 
 1 Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1981); and Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor, 2000). [ 205 ]
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government action and inaction in causing the famine, and (3) how to think 
about the moral implications of the famine. 
The Origins of the Famine: Food Availability and Distribution
We  begin  by  responding  to  the  contribution  of  Hazel  Smith,  which 
focuses on a narrow but critical point regarding how we assess the supply and 
demand of grain in the mid-1990s. Before turning to this issue, however, it is 
important to place this disagreement in broader context. In her book Hungry 
for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance, and Social Change 
in North Korea2 (subsequently HP) Smith agrees that North Korean economic 
strategy had “intrinsic weaknesses” (HP, p. 45) and “inherent institutional 
flaws” (HP, p. 65). She agrees that the strategy of seeking self-reliance in food 
was a fundamental mistake given the country’s endowments (HP, pp. 60–62) 
and that this strategy created an “inbuilt fragility” (HP, p. 74); moreover, she 
documents that this vulnerability was visible well before the collapse in the 
mid-1990s (HP, p. 66). The fall of the Soviet Union was a major shock to 
North Korea, but our account and Smith’s are in agreement that the North 
Korean government’s response to this shock—an intensification of its failed 
agricultural strategy and the imposition of austerity—was unsuccessful (HP, 
p. 66); she calls that response “tentative and vacillating” (HP, p. 78) and 
outlines the propagandistic response of the regime to the unfolding tragedy 
(HP, pp. 92–93). Despite her focus on food availability in this review, Smith 
has documented the distributional consequences of the famine for the North 
Korean working class on the country’s east coast (HP, pp. 83–86) and the 
inequalities in the distribution of food between the capital and provinces and 
across provinces (HP, pp. 86–87). These points of convergence are critically 
important for understanding the debate because they suggest an explanation 
of the famine that is quite at odds with what Smith presents in her remarks in 
this roundtable.
Smith’s critique centers primarily on the question of the adequacy of 
food supplies in the short run, an interpretation of the famine that appears 
to emphasize the effects of the floods of 1995 on both production and food 
stocks. This climactic explanation for the famine not only was offered by 
the North Koreans at the time but also has been a recurrent theme in the 
analysis of socialist famines. The literature on the Chinese famine underwent 
a similar cycle, initially focusing on climatic shocks (in accordance with the 
 2 Hazel Smith, Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance, and Social Change 
in North Korea (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2005).[ 206 ]
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Chinese government’s own claims) before finally encompassing the political 
environment that created vulnerability to “natural” shocks in the first place.
In the case of the North Korean famine, the plausibility of this climactic 
account is belied in part by the chronology of events. In the context of a 
secular decline in domestic production that began in the late 1980s, the 
regime responded by compressing consumption, most infamously through 
the “let’s eat two meals a day campaign.” The regime made only the most 
tepid of efforts to earn additional foreign exchange or to prioritize its use 
to finance increased food imports and made no credible appeal for external 
assistance until the spring of 1995 when the famine well under way. The 
government  initially  approached  Japan,  later  requested  assistance  from 
South Korea, and ultimately made a more open appeal through the United 
Nations system. (Famine in North Korea also documents that as aid began 
to pour into the country, commercial imports subsequently went into steep 
decline, a factor which contributed to ongoing food shortages in the wake of 
the famine, pp. 42–44.)
Floods in the summer of 1995 (as well as in the following summer) played 
an important political role in the management of the famine by facilitating the 
depiction of the famine as the product of a natural disaster. The North Korean 
government even went so far as to name the unit charged with managing aid 
relationships the “Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee.” Yet despite the 
undoubted effects of these natural events the famine was underway before the 
floods of 1995. Moreover, the fact that North Korea’s chronic food emergency 
has continued to this day should cast serious doubt on explanations based on 
weather alone.
As the famine broke in the early 1990s, the dearth of reliable data from 
North Korean authorities forced outside analysts to make some benchmarking 
assumptions in order to gauge the magnitude of the emerging crisis. A critical 
tool in this regard was the construction of food balances, a calculation of 
available supply and demand. 
The review by Smith is framed around two red herrings. By questioning 
whether there was “lots of food?” Smith implies that we believe North Korea 
had plenty for its people to eat. To the contrary, we provide ample evidence 
of the decline in the availability of food in the 1990s (pp. 33–38). Rather, the 
debate is both over the causes of this decline and over whether the decline in 
food availability alone offers sufficient explanation for the famine. Second, 
contrary to what one of her other questions suggests, we certainly are not 
arguing that “nobody was hungry”; it would be indefensible to write a book 
on famine with that presumption. [ 207 ]
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Yet we do ask two important counterfactual questions that are crucial 
to understanding the causes of the famine. First, was there an alternative 
distribution of the available food that might have alleviated distress? Second, 
were there plausible sources of external supply that could have mitigated the 
disaster? Smith apparently believes that the answers to these questions are 
“no”; the decline in food availability is the core of the story. We are more 
skeptical. However, to the extent that the decline in food availability is a causal 
factor, we need to explain why that decline occurred. As we will argue in the 
next section, the decline in food availability is but an additional component of 
the pervasive state failure of the famine years. 
For  purposes  of  clarifying  the  debate  over  food  availability  and 
distribution we will present a brief overview of the difficult task of estimating 
demand  and  supply  balances;  this  review  will  also  help  demonstrate 
that much of the information presented in Smith’s contribution to this 
roundtable is misleading. Before doing so, however, we must stress the 
importance of keeping in mind the core issues. Did demand continually 
exceed supply? More important yet, could alternative prioritization over 
different uses, increased foreign supply, or different patterns of distribution 
have alleviated distress? 
Consider  first  the  demand  side  of  the  food  balance.  The  largest 
single component of demand is human consumption; other components 
include seed, livestock feed, and industrial and non-essential uses. Smith 
mischaracterizes  both  our  work  and  the  work  of  other  researchers  on 
consumption  demand,  claiming  that  Famine  in  North  Korea  minimizes 
the importance and rigidity of non-consumption uses. Ironically, our book 
considers estimates of non-consumption use that are considerably larger 
than those invoked in Smith’s comments. These estimates must, however, 
be evaluated in the context of a full range of such estimates and with a close 
consideration  both  of  what  components  of  aggregate  demand  could  be 
compressed and of how aggregate supply could have been augmented. 
In  its  simplest  form,  an  estimate  of  human  consumption  demand 
is formed by multiplying population size by per capita consumption. In 
the  case  of  North  Korea  in  the  1990s,  significant  disagreement  existed 
over population size. Analysts now suspect that if anything the Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO) and World Food Program (WFP) probably 
overestimated the population, in part because of the ravages of the famine [ 208 ]
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itself.  As  a  result  they  would,  at  least  at  times,  have  also  overestimated 
aggregate grain demand.3 
There was also no consensus regarding the North Korean diet, which is 
an extremely important factor in assessing the implications of the decline in 
the supply of different types of foods. Smith contends that we misunderstand 
the  role  of  grains  in  the  North  Korean  diet  and  confuse  “calories  with 
commodities.” Unfortunately, the confusion on both issues is Smith’s. 
Smith  cites  Kim,  Lee,  and  Sumner  as  concluding  that  “the  rice  and 
corn requirements of an average North Korean in the early to mid-1990s 
[are] roughly 87% of the requirements of a South Korean in the 1960s.” This 
characterization is incorrect. Rather, Kim, Lee, and Sumner, whose work we 
do cite in our book, constructed an estimate of grain demand.4 Contrary 
to  Smith’s  review,  these  researchers  make  no  claim  that  on  the  basis  of 
their estimate the level of North Korean per capita consumption is 87% of 
South Korean consumption. Rather these three researchers simply make the 
observation that during the 1960s the share of South Korean caloric intake 
coming from grain was 87%. They go on to note the that if this were also the 
grain share in caloric consumption for North Koreans in the 1990s then by 
implication North Korea would have had the “highest grain share among the 
63 countries that needed food aid in 1995.”5 Nor do Kim, Lee, and Sumner 
derive an estimate of the role of grains in the North Korean diet comparable 
to the “87%” figure—precisely because they had no information on non-grain 
 3 The initial Food and Agriculture Organization/World Food Program (FAO/WFP) assessment 
released in December 1995 implied that the population was just over 22 million. See “Crop and 
Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” FAO/WFP, 
Special Report, December 22, 1995. In the November 1997 food balance calculation the FAO/WFP 
assumed that the mid-year 1998 population would be 23.5 million. See “Crop and Food Supply 
Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” FAO/WFP, Special Report, 
November 25, 1997, 12 u http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_file=/DOCREP/004/
W7289E/W7289E00.HTM. As a point of comparison, the South Korean government’s estimate was 
21.9 million. See Korea Statistical Information Services website u http://www.kosis.kr/. By June 
1999, however, famine mortality was of such a magnitude that it was germane to calculate overall 
demand. See “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea,” FAO/WFP, Special Report, June 29, 1999, 10n7 u http://www.fao.org/documents/
show_cdr.asp?url_file=/docrep/004/x2437e/x2437e00.htm. Food balances were subsequently 
recalculated based on an official North Korean government population estimate of 22.55 million 
for August 1999—amounting to a downward revision of nearly one million people from the FAO/
WFP’s previous assumption. See “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea,” FAO/WFP, Special Report, November 8, 1999, 11 u http://www.fao.
org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_file=/docrep/004/x3691e/x3691e00.htm.
 4 To estimate human consumption Kim, Lee, and Sumner used official North Korean estimates 
of public distribution system (PDS) grain rations. Having no data on any other component of 
the North Korean diet, they assumed that North Korean meat consumption was equal to that in 
South Korea in the 1960s in order to impute livestock feed demand, and then made additional 
assumptions derived from South Korean data to calibrate other uses.
 5 Woon keun Kim, Hyunok Lee, and Daniel A. Sumner, “Assessing the Food Situation in North 
Korea,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 46, no. 3 (April 1998): 527.[ 209 ]
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food sources. In her review, Smith has therefore taken a simple observation 
that the three researchers make about the caloric share of grains within South 
Korean diets and turned this observation into a supposed comment about 
relative consumption levels between North and South Korea. 
Australian economist Heather Smith, however, did examine the role of 
grains in the North Korean diet.6 She did this by conducting a comprehensive 
analysis  of  North  Korea’s  historical  consumption  patterns  of  all  food 
categories, including vegetables such as cabbage (the basis for kimchi and 
explicitly included in state and cooperative farm work plans). She compared 
this data not only to data for South Korea but for a wider range of countries as 
well.7 Contrary to Hazel Smith’s assertion that “protein from anything other 
than soya was and remains a luxury good,” Heather Smith demonstrated that 
in North Korea, which has a long sea coast and numerous rivers, both fish 
and marine products have historically been an important source of protein, 
dwarfing reliance on meat. Most importantly for this discussion, however, 
she  concluded  that  the  cereals  consumption  figure  adopted  by  the  FAO/
WFP probably overstated the role of cereals in the North Korean diet by 
approximately 20%. 
Thus the most systematic evaluation of the assumptions underlying the 
single most important component of demand implied that the UN system 
estimates were overstated by a non-trivial amount. In our book, however, we 
do not rely solely on these revisions; given the uncertainty surrounding any 
such estimates we report two alternatives—the official UN numbers and an 
adjustment of the UN data to reflect Heather Smith’s critique—leaving the 
reader to decide how much weight to place on her analysis.
Any calculation of total demand must include not only what humans eat 
but other uses of grain, including most notably seed and feed as well as post-
harvest losses. Hazel Smith claims that “the authors’ argument is based upon 
the assumption that cereal required for seed, feed, and post-harvest losses 
 6 Heather Smith, “The Food Economy: Catalyst for Collapse?” in Economic Integration of the Korean 
Peninsula, ed. Marcus Noland (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1998).
 7 Hazel Smith inaccurately insinuates that we believe that “grain” refers solely to rice and corn. 
Grain also encompasses wheat, barley, and millet, though it is normally rice and corn which are 
highlighted insofar as they account for more than three-quarters of the cereals distributed through 
the PDS. Additional confusion arises from Smith’s reference to the role of potatoes, which are 
sometimes misclassified as cereals in UN system calculations. Potatoes were initially folded into 
cereals in FAO/WFP assessments, but as they began to be distributed widely through the PDS 
in 1996, the FAO/WFP calculations began breaking them out separately. The United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), for example, explicitly excluded potatoes in its calculation 
of “grain” requirements. See “Thematic Roundtable Meeting on Agricultural Recovery and 
Environmental Protection for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK),” UNDP, Geneva, 
May 28–29, 1998.[ 210 ]
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were non-essential or optional.” There is simply no basis for this statement. 
In Famine in North Korea (pp. 45–49) we in fact go to great length to present 
three demand-side targets: minimum human needs as defined by the FAO/
WFP assessment, normal human demand based on North Korea’s claims 
about pre-crisis consumption (which notably are similar to the Kim, Lee, and 
Sumner estimates), and total demand inclusive of non-human consumption 
uses. “Non-human” uses as defined by the FAO and WFP consist of livestock 
feed, seed, post-harvest losses, and other uses including not only industrial 
applications  but  also  the  production  of  alcohol  and  non-essential  foods 
such as confectionary cakes (even though the latter products are obviously 
consumed). 
In her critique, which appears to center primarily on this most expansive 
conception  of  demand,  Smith  places  particular  emphasis  on  seed  and 
maintains that our argument rests on a misunderstanding of the basics of 
agriculture. In fact, while seed is obviously important and compressing seed 
stock is not sustainable, seed is quantitatively a relatively small component 
of total demand. The undue emphasis on seed in Smith’s critique is a red 
herring. 
Much  more  germane  are  feed  requirements  and  post-harvest  losses. 
Smith’s  claim  that  these  non-human  uses  have  remained  “fairly  stable 
over time” is fundamentally misleading. In fact, not only does significant 
quantitative uncertainty surround feed requirements and post-harvest losses, 
but these uses require some consideration because both are amenable to 
compression—and are so amenable in two senses of the word. In a real sense, 
grain devoted to these uses can, at least temporarily, be reallocated to human 
consumption. Yet these uses can also be compressed in an accounting sense as 
there is evidence that the initial FAO/WFP estimated levels were generous. 
We begin with livestock feed, both because the estimated requirement 
of cereal use for feed has exhibited the greatest change and because this use 
was susceptible to prioritized reduction during the famine. The initial 1995 
FAO/WFP assessment estimated feed requirements at 1.4 million metric tons 
(MT) of cereal, well above Kim, Lee, and Sumner’s estimate for a typical year 
of 584,000 MT.8 Subsequent reports (corroborated by eyewitness accounts) 
described culling of livestock on the order of “30 to 90 percent,”9 “more than 
 8 “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” 
December 22, 1995, 5, table 2; and Kim, Lee, and Sumner, “Assessing the Food Situation in North 
Korea,” 525, table 3.
 9 “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” FAO/WFP, Special Alert, no. 270, September 6, 1996, 3 u 
http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_file=/DOCREP/004/W3690E/W3690E00.HTM.[ 211 ]
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half,”10 and “most.”11 Furthermore, the UN Development Program (UNDP) 
reported that “livestock and poultry populations fell dramatically after the 
floods.”12 As a consequence of these reductions in herd size, the estimated 
feed requirement was cut to 600,000 MT for the 1996–97 marketing year13 
and to 300,000 for the 1997–98 marketing year.14 The estimates remained 
constant for a number of years—despite the fact that the FAO/WFP reported 
that livestock populations were rebounding and by 1999 had surpassed 1996 
numbers.15 
Yet in the 2003–04 assessment the FAO/WFP reported a figure on feed 
demand provided by the North Korean agriculture ministry; this figure of 
178,000 MT (the figure that Smith cites in her review)16 increased slightly in 
the 2004–05 calculation to 181,000 MT.17 
In  other  words,  over  the  course  of  a  decade  the  estimated  feed 
requirement fell by more than 1 million MT—from nearly a quarter of 
total use to less than 5%—despite a reported increase in herd size. We 
make this observation not to belittle the analysts at the FAO and WFP 
who were operating under extraordinarily difficult circumstances, though 
with hindsight their estimates appear internally inconsistent. Rather we 
cite them to illustrate that there was not only considerable uncertainty 
regarding important components of non-human demand but apparently 
significant room for their compression as well. These developments in feed 
  10 “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, FAO/
WFP, Special Report, December 6, 1996, 3 u http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_
file=/DOCREP/004/W3690E/W3690E00.HTM.
  11 “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” 
FAO/WFP, Special Alert, no. 275, June 3, 1997, 2 u http://www.fao.org/giews/english/alertes/
sakor975.htm. This report also observes that the extensive culling of livestock should have, at least 
temporarily, increased the supply of meat and thereby reduced demands for other foods.
  12 The UNDP report goes on to quantify these losses: “Data gathered for the purposes of this study 
indicate a reduction of 37 percent of cattle, 36 percent for sheep and goats. More importantly, 
grain eating pig and poultry populations declined by 57 percent and 90 percent, respectively.” See 
“Thematic Roundtable Meeting,” 16.
  13 “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” 
December 6, 1996, 8.
  14 “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” 
November 25, 1997, 13, table 5.
  15 “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” 
November 8, 1999, 10, table 1; and “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea,” FAO/WFP, Special Report, October 26, 2001, table 5 u http://www.fao.
org/docrep/004/y2248e/y2248e00.htm.
16  “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” FAO/
WFP, Special Report, October 30, 2003, 18 u http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_
file=/DOCREP/006/J0741E/J0741E00.htm.
17  “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” FAO/
WFP, Special Report, November 22, 2004, 16 u http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_
file=/docrep/007/j2972e/j2972e00.htm.[ 212 ]
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consumption stand in stark contrast to Smith’s claims that these magnitudes 
were “fairly stable over time”. 
Finally,  consider  post-harvest  losses.  Early  FAO/WFP  calculations 
assumed that these were relatively minor, but they were raised to 12% of 
production for the 1997  −98 balance sheet18 and 15% the following year19 
and by assumption have remained constant since, despite North Korean 
government attempts to reduce these losses.20 Contra Smith, this relative 
constancy derives not from some “iron law” of food spoilage but rather 
represents the outcome of political negotiations among the WFP, the FAO, 
and the North Korean government and is without serious empirical basis; 
recent FAO/WFP reports even openly acknowledge as much.21 
It is important, however, that the deeper substantive point not get lost in 
the rectification of misrepresentations. Higher post-harvest losses certainly 
change the demand balance, but what are the sources of these post-harvest 
losses? Some of these losses must of necessity be attributed to purely technical 
problems associated with storage and transport. As we detail in Famine in 
North Korea (particularly pp. 56–58), however, these losses must also be seen 
in the context of the failure to provide adequate incentives to farmers, the 
subsequent hoarding behavior of these farmers, and diversion to the market. 
These factors, in turn, must ultimately be traced to the pervasive government 
involvement in the production and distribution of grain and reflect deep 
distributional struggles over food. 
We understand the constraints of a short review, but Smith’s comments 
regarding the demand for food in North Korea fundamentally misrepresent 
our work. In Famine in North Korea we are clear about the risks associated 
with all estimates, provide the bases for ours, and offer the reader not simply 
one estimate of demand but ample information to make a judgment based on 
three alternatives. By a very expansive definition of demand, incorporating 
  18 “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” 
November 25, 1997, 12.
  19 “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” FAO/
WFP, Special Report, November 12, 1998, 13–14 u http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.
asp?url_file=/DOCREP/004/X0449E/X0449E00.HTM.
  20 “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” FAO/
WFP, Special Report, July 27, 2001, 12 u http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/y1418e/y1418e00.htm.
 2 1 For example, an FAO/WFP report states that “the level of post-harvest crop loss in DPR Korea 
has been a contentious issue in recent years, with estimates ranging from 2 percent to as high as 
30 percent. Unfortunately, none is based on quantified investigation.” See “Crop and Food Supply 
Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” October 30, 2003, 17  –18. 
The following year’s report reads “the level of post-harvest crop loss in DPR Korea has been a 
contentious issue in recent years, with estimates ranging from 3 percent to more than 30 percent. 
Unfortunately, no systematic investigations have been taken to clarify the issue.” See “Crop and Food 
Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” November 22, 2004, 15.[ 213 ]
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the  FAO/WFP’s  highest  estimates  of  non-human  use  of  2.3  million  MT, 
supply always fell short. Yet by this definition, supply fell short in every year 
from 1990 through 2004 (see p. 48, figure 2.8) despite the fact that the gravity 
of these shortages was by no means constant. The demand constraints that 
Smith wants to fix with precision clearly must be approached with caution. It 
seems more plausible to argue, as we do in our book, that “this shortfall does 
not imply an inability to meet basic needs but rather would reflect a failure to 
meet basic needs because alternative uses were prioritized” (p. 48). 
Equally if not more important, however, is the supply side of the food 
balance. Most of the grain consumed in North Korea is produced domestically; 
Smith apparently accepts our analysis of local production yet claims that 
we ignore higher figures on imports than the ones we report, again citing 
Kim, Lee, and Sumner. In fact, there is no systematic difference in the two 
series, despite their being based on differing original sources (unpublished 
USDA data in the case of Kim, Lee, and Sumner and UN data in our case). In 
some years our estimate is higher, in some years lower. For the years that the 
two series overlap, the discrepancies average 59,000 MT, 7% of commercial 
imports, or about 1% of total notional demand. Yet again, the central story 
line not only gets lost in Smith’s account but also gets turned upside down. 
Assume for the sake of argument that we have underestimated commercial 
imports;  aggregate  supplies  would  then  have  been  even  higher  than  we 
calculated, reinforcing our point about the famine’s distributional origins.
Given that Smith found discrepancies of 1% of notional supply worthy 
of comment, it is surprising that she does not discuss the issue of stockpiles. 
Stocks are potentially of far greater quantitative importance in terms of the 
balance sheet calculations that are the central focus of her review and play 
a central role in her own account of the famine. In her book, Smith alleges 
that in 1994 and 1995 as much as 3 million MT—equivalent to approximately 
80% of contemporaneous harvests or enough to feed the whole country for 
more than nine months—were destroyed in floods (HP, p. 67). If true, the 
maintenance of stocks of this magnitude in the midst of a famine would itself 
represent a stunning indictment of the North Korean regime and undercut 
the simple FAD interpretation of the famine; the decline in the availability of 
food would have been the result of government hoarding. Yet the sole source 
for this extraordinary claim is a passing mention in an unpublished paper by 
a former State Department bureaucrat of problematic credibility. This former 
official, in turn, attributes this claim to an unnamed UN official, who in turn, 
ascribes it to the dinner conversation statement of an unidentified North 
Korean official. In short, discrepancies across original sources amounting [ 214 ]
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to roughly 1% of demand are disputed, but enough grain to feed the whole 
country for nine months can exist—and then be destroyed—on the basis of 
hearsay. Who is spinning fairytales?
There  is  considerable  uncertainty  about  the  food  balances.  Precisely 
because  of  this  uncertainty,  we  present  three  demand  targets  (minimum 
human needs, normal human demand, and normal total demand) together 
with data on actual supplies as well as counterfactual calculations on what 
level supplies might have reached had North Korea maintained commercial 
imports.  We  present  this  data  in  a  way  that  allows  readers  to  weigh  the 
evidence and draw their own conclusions. 
Our presentation highlights three issues. First, the prioritization across 
alternative  uses  was  critical  to  observed  outcomes.  Demand  for  non-
consumption uses cannot simply be treated as fixed, particularly in the face of 
widespread human distress. 
Second, the costs of closing the gap between supply and even the most 
expansive definition of demand, one calculated using the maximum figures 
ever reported for non-human use, was relatively small. Smith’s critique fails 
to address this crucial point of the book: that with a relatively modest reform 
effort with respect to the external sector, North Korea could have tapped 
external sources of supply that would have at least alleviated, if not altogether 
mitigated, the famine. 
Third and more importantly, by focusing selectively on the unreliability 
of some food balance calculations, Smith sidesteps the distributional aspects 
of the famine, most notably across provinces. Given that we treat this issue 
in detail in chapter 3 of Famine in North Korea, it does not bear replaying 
here. Yet even the most thorough defense of the FAD interpretation22 provides 
data showing that per person rations in Pyongyang during the famine were 
at times double those in the most affected provinces, and refugee interviews 
suggest strongly that those reported numbers in disfavored provinces were 
almost certainly inflated.23 Distribution mattered.
  22 Suk Lee, “Food Shortages and Economic Institutions in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” 
(PhD diss., Department of Economics, University of Warwick, 2003). Smith appears to be very 
concerned with our citations of the secondary literature; one of her odder statements involves Lee’s 
work, on whose dissertation examination committee one of us sat. We cite his work approvingly in 
some respects (his estimates of famine deaths, for example) while disagreeing with other aspects of 
his work, particularly his interpretation of the North Korean case as a simple FAD famine.
  23 Smith herself has brought these distributional issues to the fore in her work but in this roundtable 
she now seems to discount them as an important causal force in the extent of the famine. See 
Smith, Hungry for Peace, 83–87.[ 215 ]
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The Role of Government
Underneath  these  technical  issues  is  not  only  the  debate  over  food 
availability  versus  distribution  but  the  underlying  question  of  what  role 
government  action  and  inaction  played  in  generating  the  famine  in  the 
first place. Smith believes that we attribute the famine to “an omniscient, 
manipulative, and evil actor (the North Korean government) whose activities 
are beyond rational calculation,” akin to “ascribing explanatory power to the 
Wicked Witch of the East.” Yet this portrayal bears no relationship to the 
political economy of the regime as we understand it and have described it in 
our book. 
Communist  systems  are  autocracies  under  which  dominant  parties 
monopolize both political power and have—historically at least—suppressed 
private property and markets. The suppression of private property and markets 
should not be understood solely in ideological or developmental terms; state 
control of the economy also has the effect of curtailing alternative sources of 
social power and of making the population dependent on the government, 
including with respect to employment, access to basic social services, and 
food. This dependence is a crucial element of political and social control 
and creates a particular set of vulnerabilities. Because the government is the 
ultimate source of food, government failure has immediate and far-reaching 
implications, particularly for the urban population. 
Autocracies,  however,  are  not  accountable  to  the  public  or  to  any 
“social contract” in a meaningful sense. Leadership failures do not result in 
government turnover because dissent can be repressed and disaffection—even 
misery—be ignored. As a result, authoritarian leaders have fewer incentives 
than accountable governments to maintain this (or any other) “consensus.” 
What, after all, could it mean to have a social contract with a dictator with this 
degree of repressive capability? 
Moreover, when distress hits, autocrats have every incentive to make sure 
that core constituencies—in North Korea including the party, the military 
(elite at least), and residents of Pyongyang—receive first draw on the resources 
in question. Chapter 3 of our book shows in some detail that this occurred.24 
Authoritarian rule has powerful distributional implications.
It is not that the government is deliberately starving the population, a 
position  Smith  incorrectly  attributes  to  us,  although  the  distribution  of 
food to some areas and the treatment of the prison population during the 
  24 Smith herself has argued this at some length in her own account. See Smith, Hungry for Peace, 
79–88.[ 216 ]
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famine should not be ruled out in this regard. Rather it is that the economic 
structure and strategy of the socialist regime produced an agricultural and 
food distribution system rife with vulnerabilities. When shocks hit, the nature 
of the political system gave leaders few incentives to make necessary external 
and internal adjustments and strong incentives to protect their own.
Andrei Lankov poses the core question in a somewhat different way: 
why couldn’t North Korea have followed a path more similar to that seen in 
China and Vietnam, namely to sustain—or even bolster—dominant party 
rule while also undertaking growth-enhancing reforms? One answer is that 
the underlying economic characteristics of the three countries were different; 
the much larger labor-intensive agricultural sector in China and Vietnam 
at the times that they implemented reforms were more propitious for both 
economic and political reasons (pp. 210–12). 
Another answer is that China and Vietnam faced less severe external 
military  constraints  than  North  Korea.  China  pursued  reform  following 
normalization of relations with the United States, and the turn to reform in 
Vietnam also followed positive developments in Vietnam’s external political 
environment.  Edward  Reed  makes  a  similar  point  in  noting  that  “North 
Korea has claimed that threats to national (or regime) security…constrained 
the implementation of more far-reaching reforms” and that sanctions, in 
particular, limited the effects of those reforms the government did choose to 
launch. 
Yet a simple comparison of Vietnam and North Korea is instructive. 
Vietnam’s war with the United States was more recent than North Korea’s and 
involved more American casualties, presumably creating greater obstacles on 
both sides for normalization of relations with the United States. Nevertheless, 
the Vietnamese leadership successfully normalized political relations with the 
United States, undertook wide-ranging reform, and even concluded a bilateral 
trade and investment agreement with Washington. Relations between the 
United States and North Korea have, however, stumbled from crisis to crisis. 
There  is  greater  plausibility  to  the  argument  that  the  external 
environment has blocked reform for the most recent period. The hard-line 
posture of the first administration of George W. Bush, such as the “axis of 
evil” speech, the open discussion of a right to pre-empt, and the invasion of 
Iraq all may have had the unintended consequence of making it harder for 
any reformers in North Korea to gain domestic political traction. 
It is important, however, to underline that this was not the case in the 
early 1990s. North Korea experienced the collapse of a key patron in the 
Soviet Union, as did Vietnam. Yet Pyongyang also enjoyed the opportunity [ 217 ]
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provided by a major peace initiative from South Korea under the Roh Tae 
Woo administration and even by an initiative from the George H.W. Bush 
administration for denuclearization of the peninsula. Even if we believe that 
U.S. management of the first nuclear crisis was bungled, that crisis was largely 
of North Korea’s own making; the regime gambled on the nuclear card by 
failing to meet basic commitments under the Nonproliferation Treaty and 
hoping to extract resources from the international community. Moreover, the 
resolution of the crisis meant a relaxation of external military constraints on 
North Korea by 1994, not an increase in them. The argument that external 
military or political pressures can be held responsible for the famine simply 
does not wash. 
Lankov  suggests  an  interesting  alternative  that—though  necessarily 
speculative—does help distinguish the North Korean case from the two other 
Asian communist states. Reform does not simply loosen controls but also cuts 
against the sustaining mythology of the North Korean regime. If North Korea 
embraces the path toward a market economy that would ultimately resemble 
that of the South, why have a separate regime at all? The risks are much greater 
than for the Chinese and Vietnamese leaderships, who can adjust socialist 
ideology at the margin more easily than can the North Korean regime.
The aid relationship u Reed focuses his comments on the dynamics 
of the aid relationship, an issue on which he has deep knowledge and that 
we take up in the second part (chapters 4–6) of our book. As is the case 
with several other participants in this roundtable, Reed suggests that we are 
critics of the aid effort; we would like to reiterate here that this was not at all 
our purpose. Humanitarian aid to North Korea was (and remains) a moral 
imperative and was painfully slow in coming; when it finally came, aid 
clearly had positive effects on the country’s welfare. Indeed, one of the core 
arguments of this part of our book is that even with substantial diversion 
of  aid  the  provision  of  food  both  directly  and  indirectly  influenced  the 
subsequent course of reform. We do not pay the attention to the NGO effort 
in the country that we might. We do, however, concur with Reed that these 
organizations forge bonds that produce effects that almost certainly exceed 
their measured financial contributions.
Our core point, rather, was to draw attention to the particular barriers that 
the North Korean government placed in the way of a coherent humanitarian 
response to the famine and the dilemmas that these barriers created for the 
donors; almost nowhere in the world do we see so clearly the Samaritan’s 
dilemma of having to provide assistance knowing that the effort is of necessity 
constrained. [ 218 ]
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Given these constraints, what conclusions should be drawn about the 
humanitarian aid effort or other forms of external assistance? Reed correctly 
characterizes our view that “that the long-term solution to the problem lies 
neither in maintaining aid flows nor merely agricultural restructuring but 
rather in implementing domestic economic reform and expanding commercial 
trade relations.” There is, however, no reason that these things cannot go 
together—indeed we hope that they would. Aid is most likely to have a long-
run developmental impact when coupled with exactly the core reforms Reed 
identifies: a more wide-ranging reform of the agricultural sector and, more 
importantly,  reforms  that  open  the  North  Korean  economy  and  expand 
commercial trade and investment relations. Industrial revitalization would 
allow North Korea to align domestic production according to comparative 
advantage, especially the exporting of mineral products and manufactures 
and the importing of bulk grains, just as neighboring South Korea and China 
do. By freeing the country from dependence on the politicized beneficence of 
outsiders, normal commercial relations would resolve the country’s chronic 
food insecurity problem. What could be more in keeping with the goal of 
self-reliance? 
On the issue of the effects of aid on such policy reforms, however, we 
are in agreement with Chung Min Lee that there are risks. As the shift takes 
place from humanitarian assistance to other forms of aid, it is important 
that  outside  donors  stand  on  principle  that  aid  will  not  be  extended  in 
the absence of policy reforms that will move the country toward long-run 
growth. This by no means implies the outside imposition of the “Washington 
consensus”; South Korea stands as stark evidence that there are multiple paths 
to prosperity. Aid extended in support of continued commitment to a state-
dominated economy makes little sense, however, and is highly unlikely to 
have the intended effect.
Reform u From 1995 onward, the state-administered PDS did not deliver 
minimum human needs, even on paper, and with the state unable to play its 
traditional role as a provider of food, households came to increasingly rely 
on the market to obtain sustenance. Left to fend for themselves, small-scale 
social units began to exhibit a variety of entrepreneurial coping behaviors to 
secure food. The authorities responded by tolerating the development (and 
expansion) of informal markets, including the revival of traditional farmers’ 
markets. For the non-privileged classes, the market has become the primary 
institutional mechanism for obtaining food. 
Aid played an ambiguous role in this process. On the one hand such 
assistance was largely distributed through the central government, reinforcing [ 219 ]
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state power. Yet on the other hand aid also encouraged the development of 
markets by creating the possibility of capturing astronomical rents through 
diversion—rents that could be realized only if markets existed. At its peak 
aid fed roughly a third of the population, and we estimate that diversion was 
probably on the order of 10–50%, implying enormous incentives to create 
those markets and capture those rents. There is evidence that the military 
has been deeply involved in this process, although probably not for its own 
consumption as Chung Min Lee suggests. Already having first draw on the 
North Korean harvest, the military is involved in a somewhat different way. In 
the absence of well-defined property rights or dispute resolution mechanisms, 
the military’s existing organization—as well as resources in the form of men, 
trucks, fuel, and, it should be said, guns—make the military ideally situated to 
perform the role of middlemen distributors.
Clearly it would have been better if the aid had reached the intended 
beneficiaries. This aid cannot, however, be considered altogether wasted; to 
the extent such assistance ended up in markets, foreign aid had both the 
short-run  effect  of  lowering  prices  and  the  longer-run—and  completely 
unintended—effect of contributing to the marketization process that is at 
the heart of what is misleadingly called the North Korean “reform.” The 
marketization that began with food gradually came to encompass a broader 
range of household goods, in part building upon officially sanctioned cottage 
industries for consumer goods. Forced sales of household items by liquidity-
constrained  households  to  secure  food  played  a  role,  as  did  gray-area 
activities by local government and party officials and enterprise managers, 
such as the sale of state assets. 
Eventually the fraying of the system became so profound that in 2002 the 
government responded with significant policy changes that in some respects 
simply  ratified  the  grass-roots  marketization  that  had  occurred  over  the 
previous decade. Since then North Korean economic policy has had a “two 
steps forward, one step back” character, and it is fair to say that the regime has 
yet to embrace reform in any fundamental sense. 
By Way of Conclusion: Memory and the Moral Economy of Famine
Differences  in  our  understanding  of  the  regime  have  profound 
consequences for any moral or ethical judgments that we might choose to 
make about the government’s culpability. On this score Smith makes two 
points: a general one regarding the risks of drawing ethical conclusions from [ 220 ]
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empirical analysis and a more specific one pertaining to the concept of crimes 
against humanity. 
On the more general point, Smith concludes with the Humean injunction 
on the dangers of drawing normative conclusions from empirical analysis and 
makes the claim—quite stunning on reflection—that “the facts can be used to 
justify any normative conclusion.” Yet the claim that the moral and material 
spheres  are  completely  compartmentalized,  with  the  former  governed  by 
what Hume called “sentiment,” is by no means uncontroversial. How, after 
all, are we supposed to ground ethical claims if not in some empirical sense of 
what is required for human flourishing? Our normative principles in Famine 
in North Korea derive from the simple observation that people should not be 
allowed to starve if it can be prevented. Smith might believe that it is wrong to 
assign culpability because the famine was a pure, unpreventable act of nature; 
this is a perfectly defensible ethical position in principle. Nevertheless, how 
would we resolve this dispute without reference to the facts? Indeed, Smith’s 
contribution is based upon the invocation of facts she believes rebut not only 
our empirical claims but also our normative conclusions as well. If we believe 
the facts can be used to justify any moral conclusion, then we are indeed left 
with little but ideology. It is Smith’s logic, rather than ours, that leads toward 
this quagmire, however. 
More  specifically,  Smith  criticizes  us  for  believing  the  North  Korean 
regime guilty of committing a crime against humanity, a term she puts in 
quotation marks early in her remarks. This term is not our invention, and 
we do not use it lightly. Over the last two decades there have been profound 
developments in international humanitarian law. These include the Rome 
Statute’s effort to define crimes against humanity and to provide the political 
and legal basis for bringing those guilty of them to justice, the nascent doctrine 
of the failure to protect, and the lucid arguments of David Marcus on the need 
for a consideration of famine crimes.25 
In all of this literature the intent of the parties is a crucial issue. 
Humanitarian  law  is,  however,  evolving  away  from  the  idea  that 
governments or other parties are culpable only in the context of widespread 
attacks on populations or when they explicitly intend to commit the crime 
in question; governments should also be held accountable for actions that 
have effects that were not fully intended but could nonetheless be foreseen. 
We do not argue that North Korean officials purposefully starved their 
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population for political reasons in the same way that Stalin did in the 
Ukraine.  The  fact  that  the  North  Korean  authorities  were  recklessly 
negligent and should have been aware of the effects of a number of their 
actions raises, however, moral issues that are beginning to receive serious 
attention.26 Of an even more serious nature are a number of discrete actions 
which appear to reflect such standards of culpability, such as the regime’s 
efforts to channel early food shipments away from the East Coast, where 
they were most desperately needed, toward Pyongyang, which suffered 
shortages but never the widespread deprivation found in the Hamgyung 
provinces. The question of the accountability of the North Korean regime 
can certainly be debated but should not be left unconsidered.
The  question  of  how  to  inject  human  rights  considerations  into 
negotiations with North Korea also has very important tactical dimensions. 
Human rights activists, no less than humanitarians, need to be attentive to the 
unintended affects of their actions. Yet as outside actors formulate strategy for 
dealing with North Korea, it is always worthwhile to go back to first principles: 
the ultimate objective of the international community should be a North 
Korea in which citizens can live in freedom and dignity without recurrent 
risk of hunger and starvation. If such an objective can only be accomplished 
by a change in or of the regime, so be it. 
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